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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE EXTRATERRESTRIAL AGE
OSCAR SVAPLv *
The progress made in aeronautical engineering in the first half
of the present century is presenting new problems regarding the juridical nature not only of the atmospheric space, which is superincumbent on land and sea, but also with respect to outer space- that
limitless region which lies outside the earth's atmosphere. The artificial satellites which in this hour are circling the planet are the
heralds of a new era, which may be called the extra-terrestrialage.
Space science is now advancing at a rate which staggers the imagination and which makes it exceedingly difficult to state legal perimeters
in conformity with resultant conditions of human experience. The
legal problems which will arise in connection with space travel will
be of a nature so different from anything in past experience that little
will remain to serve as useful guides to future norms. For this reason
it may be necessary to start anew to build a law of outer space which
may be adequate to the regulation of human conduct in this new
dimension into which mankind has so lately been precipitated.
A clear understanding of the physical nature of the earth and its
atmosphere and a knowledge of certain astronomical facts are necessary for the formulation of a sensible theory of what may be called
space law. The nature of the earth's atmosphere is known only in a
very general way to scientists, and its full extent outward from the
surface of the earth is not as yet fully determined. For purposes of an
approximate ascertainment of the outer limits of the gaseous envelope
of the earth, it might be noted that the atmosphere, or the so-called
*B.A. 1937, M.A. 1939, University of Washington; Ph.D. 1942, University of
North Carolina; author of AN INTRODUCHON TO THE LAW OF NATIONS and numerous
law review articles; cited for meritorious work in the field of international law and
awarded a diploma by the Consular Law Society; Professor of History and Political
Science, University of Florida.
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airspace, is divided into four layers. The layer which is closest to the
earth is called the troposphere; it extends approximately ten miles
outward from the planet at the equator. It is in this region that the
greatest percentage of the atmospheric gases are found, and it has
been estimated that eighty per cent of all the molecules in the atmosphere are found in this innermost layer., Where the troposphere
ends there is a boundary known as tropopause. This line of demarcation is located about five miles outside the earth at the poles, while
in the equatorial region it is eleven miles from the earth's surface.
Extending for fifty miles above the troposphere is the stratosphere,
a region without weather and well suited for air travel. There are,
however, vast temperature differentials within the stratosphere. A
fifteen-mile-thick layer of ozone in the outer regions of the stratosphere
is a significant phenomenon which protects the earth from a fatal
2
bombardment of ultraviolet rays from the sun.
Outside the stratosphere, extending for about 650 miles, is a region known as the ionosphere. Here the air is extremely thin, but it
is nevertheless capable of generating enough friction to destroy most
of the meteors that are constantly falling toward the earth.3 Temperatures as low as -100 degrees Fahrenheit have been registered in the
inner portions of the ionosphere, while in the outer regions of this
layer the temperature exceeds 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit.4 The short
waves of sunlight in the ionosphere push electrons out of atoms in
the air, leaving ions, or positively charged particles. It is this process
which accounts for the inordinately high temperatures in the outer
portion of the ionosphere. 5 Winds of velocities up to 300 miles per
hour are present in the ionosphere, causing the ions to become agitated, which in turn creates a circulating current and makes the ionosphere an electric sea. This so-called dynamo current affects the earth's
magnetic field, producing a phenomenon known as the aurora borealis. The electric properties of the ionosphere also function as a mirror
reflecting to the earth radio waves that otherwise would dissipate into
cosmic space. But, because of its electric properties and the presence
of deadly rays, the ionosphere might constitute a serious obstacle to
cosmic flights by man.
The outermost layer of the earth's atmosphere is known as the
'Newman, Air Space in Perspective, 4 N.Y.L.F. 329, 334 (1958).
2Engel, Mystery of the Air We Explore, New York Times, Apr. 15, 1956.
3Newman, supra note 1, at 335.
41bid.
5
KAHN, DESIGN OF THE UNIVERSE 310-11 (1954).
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exosphere. The ions of gas are so fiercely bombarded in this area that
temperatures in the daytime are believed to rise to 4,500 degrees
Fahrenheit.6 Inasmuch as the gravitational pull of the earth becomes
negligible in this very outmost region of the earth's atmosphere, it is
supposed that here gaseous molecules escape into empty space never
again to return to the earth.
Such, in brief, is the physical nature of the earth's atmosphere;
but of greater concern to the lawyer is the legal status not only of the
atmosphere but also of the region which lies beyond and which we
shall here call outer space.
One of the topics with which legal theory has been concerned in
the past has been the extent to which national sovereignty may be
said to penetrate into the space which lies outside the surface of the
earth. Are there limits to the exercise of a state's power in a vertical
direction from its land and water territories and, if so, what are these
limits? By way of approach to this question, a brief historical survey
may be useful for the purpose of indicating the general development
of the law, and thus, perhaps, it may be seen to what extent it is
possible to draw upon existing legal norms or to use analogy in the
solution of this problem.
In Roman law a differentiation was made between the air (aer)
that we breathe and the airspace (coelum) superincumbent on
land and sea.7 The former was regarded as res communis, free to all
and not susceptible to private dominion." On the other hand, Roman
law protected both public and private ownership in the airspace above
the land, though no heights in space were fixed to which rights extended. Bucldand points out, however, that had the Romans been
compelled to face problems created by aviation, "they would probably
have held that there was no upper limit to ownership." 9 An ancient
Roman maxim - Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos - states that he who owns the soil owns everything above and
below. It has been pointed out,10 however, that the maxim has not
been found in this form in the Roman texts, but has been traced back
directly to a gloss from which the common law appears to have bor6LEHR, WEArTn

46 (1957).
7See Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum in InternationalAir
Law, 1 McGmL L.J. 38 (1952).
8See SOHM, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 303 (Ledlie's transl., 3d ed. 1907).
9TnE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 105 (1931).
loGorove, On the Threshold of Space: Toward a Cosmic Law, 4 N.Y.L.F. 505,

312 (1958).
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rowed it. In its strictly literal meaning, however, the maxim has been
repudiated because of the growing impact of the technological revolution;" and the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Causby12 went so far as to say that the common law doctrine which would
extend ownership to the "periphery of the universe" has "no place in
the modern world." It should be noted, however, that under present
treaty law each state is regarded as sovereign in the airspace that is
superincumbent on its land and water territories. According to the
Aerial Navigation Convention of 1919, "The High Contracting Parties
recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the air space above its territory."' 1 Mr. J. M. Spaight, having reference
to the Paris convention of 1919, very simply points to the fact that
"the principle has been established that States control the atmosphere
over their territories."'14 Likewise, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, which has been described as the "constitution for the postwar global air world,"' 5 recognized in its very
first article that the state has "complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace."16
In addition to the treaty law establishing the principle of sovereignty in the airspace on the part of the subjacent state, there is of
course municipal legislation. Examples of such enactments are the
British Air Navigation Act of 19201' and, in the United States, the
Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended June 23, 1938.18 According
to the preamble of the British act, "full and absolute sovereignty and
rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and has always extended,
over the air superincumbent on all parts of His Majesty's dominions
and the territorial waters adjacent thereto." Section 176 (a) of the
American statute provides: "The United States of America is hereby
declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace above the United States, including the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace above those portions of
:"Id. at 313.
12328 U.S. 256 (1945).
'3U.S.DEP'T

OF STATE Bull.

No. 26, Pub. 2143 (1944).

14Bouv6, The Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Navigation, 1 AIR L. REv. 1 (1930).
"5FENWIcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW
16BRIGGs,

LEGISLATION 168, 169 (1950).
1710 & 11 GEO. 5, ch. 80.
:1852 STAT. 1028, 49 U.S.C.

§1401 (a),

72

411 (3d ed. 1948).
821 (2d ed. 1952); 9

THE LAW OF NATIONS

STAT.

§176

HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL

(1951), repealed by Federal Aviation Act

806 (1958).
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the adjacent marginal high seas, bays and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or convention the United States exercises
national jurisdiction." The legal status of the airspace or atmosphere,
therefore, is well established both by international conventions and by
municipal statutes. The airspace, like the territorial sea, is regarded
as an appurtenance to the land; and the subjacent state is sovereign
therein.
But to say that the nation is sovereign in the airspace above its
territory is not to solve but to state a problem. A number of questions
at once present themselves: What, for example, is comprehended by
the term airspace? What is the legal status of the region which lies
outside the earth's atmosphere? These and other questions must be
answered if a legal regime is to be established in the extra-terrestrial
space that is at all commensurate with the needs of this age.
As already indicated, the legal concept that a state has territorial
rights in the airspace above its surface is of ancient origin, but no
grave problems were presented in this connection before the age of
flight. With the coming of the balloon in 1783 and the gradual
development of aeronautical science, culminating in the achievement
of the Wright brothers in 1903, the problem of determining the legal
relationship between the airspace and the subjacent state became
acute.1 9
The absence of custom and practice as a basis for air law resulted
in the evolution of a number of theories with respect to rights of
states in the superincumbent airspace. These theories may be briefly
summarized as follows: (1) the atmosphere, like the high seas, is incapable of occupation and therefore free; (2) analogous to the maritime belt, the lower portions of the airspace are considered territorial,
while an upper and unlimited zone is free and open to all; (3) according to an ancient maxim, 20 the airspace to an unlimited height is
under the complete sovereignty of the subjacent state; and (4) the
sovereignty over the airspace, like that in the marginal seas, is subject to innocent passage for foreign aircraft. But, since innocent
passage does not apply to foreign warships in the territorial seas, it
would also be denied foreign military aircraft in the territorial air.21
loCooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 INT'L L.Q. 412 (1951).

2oCujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum. (He who owns the soil owns everything above.)
2lSee I OPPENHEm-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 469-70 (6th ed. 1947);
SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 214

(1955).

Theories of air-

space sovereignty prior to 1914 are also reviewed in HAZELTINE, LAw OF THE AIR
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In 1889, in connection with the Universal Exposition of that year,
the first international aerial congress was held in Paris. Though this
was not a conference in which states were officially represented, the
juridical questions which confronted the delegates were no less perplexing. The great concern was with the regulation of balloon flights,
which had become promiscuous over the continent of Europe. The
delegates agreed to refer questions of complex nature to a Permanent
International Commission of Aeronautics. 22 The various questions
raised at the 1889 conference were to command the attention of the
24
second Paris congress of 1900,23 the third at Milan in 1906, the fourth
at Nancy in

1909,

25

and the fifth congress at Turin in

1911.26

But in

spite of all this discussion of the problem no important conventions
were signed.
As early as 1880, the Institut de Droit Internationalbecame concerned with the question of sovereignty in the airspace, and included
air law in a draft convention on the laws of war.2 7 When the Institut
met at Neuchatel in 1900, the French jurist Paul Fauchille proposed
the formulation of an international code of air law, and at the
Brussels conference of 1902 he enunciated his famous "freedom of the
air" doctrine, based on the analogy of the free seas.2 8 This theory
was challenged by the British lawyer John Westlake when the Institut met at Ghent in 1906; he insisted on state sovereignty in the
(1911);

SLOTEMAKER,

FREEDOM

OF PASSAGE

FOR INTERNATIONAL

AIR

SERVICES

(1932);

Kuhn, The Beginning of an Aerial Law, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1910).
22Minist&e du Commerce, de r'Industrie et des Colonies, Congros Internationale
d'Aronautique tenu h Paris du 31 Juillet au 3 Aout 1889: PROCES-VERBAUX
SOMMAIRE

3 (1889).

23Ministre du Commerce, de r'Industrie, des Postes et des T61graphes, Congrs
Internationale d'Aronautique tenu A Paris du 15 Septembre au 21 Septembre.
PROCES-VERBAUX SOMMARES (1906).

24IIICongr~s International d'Adronautique, Milan 22-28 Octobre 1906, RAPPORTS & MEMOIRES Publils par les Soins de la Commission Permanente Internationale d'Aronautique (1907).
251VO Congrs International d'Aronautique, Nancy 18-23 Septembre 1909, PROCES-VERBAUX, RAPPORTS & MEMOIRFS, Publi&s par les Soins de la Commission Permanente Internationale d'Aronautique (1909).
26V, Congr6s International d'Aronautique, Terin 25-31 Octobre 1911, PROCEsVERBAUX,

RAPPORTS & MEMOIRES Publis par les Soins de la Commission Permanente

Internationale d'Adronautique et de la Societi Aviazione Torino (1912).
27See Young, The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Space Sovereignty, 24 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 571 (1955).
2
SSee Fauchille, Le Domaine et le Regime Juridique des Aerostats, 8 REvuE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 414 (1901).
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29
airspace, and added that there was no limit to its upward extension.
The Institut, however, pronounced in favor of Fauchille's doctrine. 30
In 1909, only six years after the Wright brothers had made their
historic flight at Kitty Hawk, Louis Bl6riot, a French pilot, crossed
the English Channel in a heavier-than-air craft. From this day on,
it became clear that the security of international boundaries could
no longer be achieved by means of land fortifications, or exclusively
by land and naval armaments. Man had conquered a new element and
had projected himself in a new dimension.
Even before Bl~riot's famous exploit, the French government, because of unregulated flights of balloons over the continent of Europe,
had decided to call an international conference on aviation. 31 By the
time this conference met in Paris in 1910, not only balloons but
heavier-than-air craft presented a variety of regulatory problems. Because of a sharp conflict between the mutually exclusive principles of
a "right to fly" and "complete sovereignty" in the airspace on the part
of the subjacent state, no agreement was possible except on certain
technical points. These included such things as uniform registration
of aircraft, certificates of navigability, and pilots' licenses. 32 It has
been said that the Paris Conference of 1910 marks the termination of
the first phase in legislative efforts to internationalize the airspace.
According to one authority: "But for the firm position of the British
Government, the doctrine of sovereignty of the airspace might have
disappeared for all practical purposes in 1910, international freedom
of flight might have been accepted, and the whole history of international aviation in subsequent years might have been very different." 3.
The experience of the First World War tended to place security
considerations in the forefront, and the Paris Convention of 1919
marks the repudiation of the theory of "freedom of the air," which
Fauchille advocated in 1902. If security considerations were dominant
at Paris in 1919, this was no less true at Chicago in 1944. Yet this
conference convened in high hopes, and President Roosevelt, in his
opening address, welcomed the delegates with the following words:
"I hope you will not dally with the thought of creating great blocs of

29See Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 IrNr'L L.Q. 412

(1951).
3OANNUAIME DE L'INSITuT DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 297, 327-28

(1906).

31SvARLrEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 213 (1955).

3S2bid.
33
Cooper, Some Historic Phases of British International Civil Aviation Policy,
23 INT'L AY'. 189, 191 (1947).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
closed air, thereby tracing in the sky the conditions of possible future
wars." 34 Although many conflicting viewpoints of the fifty-four nations
represented could not be reconciled, the conference was productive of
a convention, three separate agreements, and several resolutions and
recommendations. As indicated above, the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 recognized "complete and exclusive
sovereignty" on the part of the subjacent state in the "airspace above
its territory."' 35 And the territory of a state was defined in Article 2 of
the Convention as "the land areas and territorial waters adjacent
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of
such State." At this point two main questions present themselves:
First, what was the meaning in existing law of the term airspace?
Second, what is the status of outer space?
There has never been a satisfactory definition in the law of the
term airspace, though there is some evidence that this term may be
regarded as synonymous with the earth's atmosphere. It has been
pointed out, for example, that in the French version of the Paris
Convention of 1919, the term airspaceappears as espace atmosphfriqu
and in Italian as spazio atmosferico. According to John Cobb Cooper:
"It seems apparent from this that the words 'air space' in the English
version meant, without question, 'atmospheric space.' "36 But, as already seen, the physical nature of the atmosphere is such as to make
it extremely difficult to determine its extent outward from the surface
of the earth. Furthermore, it may not be practical, for a variety of
reasons, to make state sovereignty coextensive with the atmosphere or
airspace.
Professor Cooper, in 1951, advanced the opinion that "at any particular time the territory of each State extends upward into space as
far as then scientific progress of any State in the international com''3
munity permits such State to control space above it." This proposal,
however, has been severely criticized, among other things, for its clear
implication that "might makes right." And in 1956, in an address
before the American Society of International Law, Professor Cooper
came forward with a revision of his earlier theory. He recommended
the adoption of an international agreement which would divide the
34U.S. DEP'T
ference (1945).

OF STATE

Pub. No. 2282, 4-5. International Civil Aviation Con-

35Art. 1.
36See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
374 INT'L

87 (1956).

L.Q. 418 (1951).
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airspace above a state's territory into three zones as follows:3 s
"(a) Reaffirm Article I of the Chicago Convention, giving the
subjacent state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric
space above it, up to the height where 'aircraft' as now defined,
may be operated, such areas to be designated 'territorial space.'
(b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to
300 miles above the earth's surface, designating this second
area as 'contiguous space,' and provide for a right to transit
through this zone for all non-military flight instrumentalities
when ascending or descending. (c) Accept the principle that all
space above 'contiguous space' is free for the passage of all
instrumentalities."
These proposals, though later revised,3 9 have also been subjected
to certain objections on the grounds that it is premature to engage in
such a division of the atmosphere; that the extent of territorial space
is not defined; that the concept of "contiguous space" is based on a
false analogy and cannot be implemented; and, finally, that the use
of the atmosphere " is already governed by precise rules." 40 Whatever
the merits of the various theories and arguments which are now current in the literature dealing with air and space law, recent advances
in the sciences of aeronautics and astronautics have presented new
problems to which the law, as yet, has provided no satisfactory answers. The increasing number of launchings into outer space of
various instrumentalities, including artificial satellites, has created a
situation that is no longer merely academic but one which is of immediate and practical concern.
In three shots, beginning in October of 1957, the Soviet Union
placed in orbit satellites weighing 184, 1,120, and 2,920 pounds respectively. The weights involved would indicate that great progress
has been made in developing exceedingly powerful launching vehicles.
Another indication of great advances in the field of astronautics was
the announcement by the United States in May of 1958 that a nose
cone carried by a Jupiter rocket had successfully re-entered the earth's
atmosphere at a speed of 9,000 miles per hour and had been recovered intact. Adding to these achievements is the spectacular Soviet
SBSee PROCEEDINGS, supra note 86, at 91.
3
gSee Cooper's letter to The Times (London), Sept. 2, 1957, p. 9, col. 5.
4oGorove, On the Threshold of Space: Toward a Cosmic Law, 4 N.Y.L.F. 305,

322 (1958).
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"moonshot" of January 2, 1959, by which a cosmic rocket weighing
about one and a half tons was placed in orbit around the sun. On
March 3 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the
United States made the announcement that a space capsule, known as
Pioneer IV, had been fired over the moon into a solar orbit millions of
miles from the earth. In view of events such as these, and the assurance
of scientists that the day is not far off when man himself will embark
on cosmic flight, it might not be premature for lawyers to consider
some of the legal problems appertaining to outer space.
The first and most basic problem which presents itself is the territorial status of outer space. With respect to this matter the present
41
author wrote, in 1955, as follows:
"Though the present law grants to the subjacent state
sovereignty in the airspace, it should not be inferred from this
that such sovereignty is without limitations. Furthermore ...
the airspace must be considered as coterminous in all directions
with the earth's atmosphere. There is certainly nothing in the
existing law to warrant any other conclusion. Thus there are
two main questions to which the law must eventually provide
the answers: (1) What are the limitations, if any, upon the
sovereignty of the subjacent state in the airspace? (2) What is
the legal status of outer space?
"The answer to the first of these questions, we think, is to
some degree found in existing treaties. As regards the second,
there is - at this time, at least - not even a partial answer. We
suggest, therefore, that a page be lifted from international
maritime law and that the outer space be considered as analogous to the open sea. In this manner, all the outer space, as it
stretches indefinitely outward beyond the earth's atmosphere,
and including all the natural satellites of this planet, can be
regarded as res communis, the common property of all nations.
This would mean that the outer space, as we have defined it
above, would be free to all mankind and therefore incapable
of occupation and control except as a result of collective action,
and for peaceful purposes, through effective international organization. This, indeed, would not preclude the building of
space stations, should the technical difficulties be overcome.
But this could only be done for peaceful purposes, such as the
41SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

LAW OF NATIONS

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss1/1

225 (1955).

10

Svarlien: Legal Problems in the Extra-Terrestrial Age
THE EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL AGE
control of climatic conditions in certain parts of the world,
and only if in the opinion of enlightened and reasonable men
the benefits to the human race would outweigh the cost of such
projects."
Sovereignty of the subjacent state in atmospheric space may be
defended not only in terms of the positive law of existing conventions
but also on the basis of the natural fact that the airspace is an appurtenance to the earth. But the projection of state power beyond the
airspace would be inconsistent with basic astronomical facts and
would be a violation of natural law. The revolution of the earth on
its axis, its rotation around the sun, and the movement of the solar
system itself throughout the galaxy all require that the relationship
of sovereignties on earth to space beyond the atmosphere be never
constant for the smallest fraction of time. According to C. Wilfred
Jenks: "Such a projection into space of sovereignties based on particular areas of the earth's surface would give us a series of adjacent
irregularly shaped cones with a constantly changing content."4 2 Another difficulty would be the fact that missiles, space platforms, and
ships moving in space at great speeds would be constantly changing
their positions in relation to subjacent territorial states. Thus there
would be no relationship between control over such vehicles and the
territorial aspects of states.
In spite of such difficulties in connection with territorial claims
in outer space as are presented by the physical nature of the universe, man's activity in the region beyond the earth's atmosphere will
increasingly require regulation. And, even though the problems
which nations will here encounter are not unilaterally soluble, regulatory measures will first be attempted through national legislation.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the United States has
already enacted what is believed to be the world's first statute on
astronautics, The National Aeronautics and Space Act.4 3 This legislation creates a new government agency known as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, whose function it is to exercise
control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United
States.4 4 It is safe to say that one of the major problems with which
42Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, SPAcE LAW 93 (1958), a
symposium prepared at the request of Sen. Lyndon D. Johnson, Chairman Special
Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
43Pub. L. 568, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
44Beresford, The Legal Control of Outer Space, SPACE LAw 411 (1958).
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this agency will be confronted is the absence of law having application to flight through outer space.
There is a reasonable analogy with respect to space law which may
be useful in any consideration of this problem, namely, the law of the
sea. The oceans, which cover nearly three quarters of the earth, have
long been the highroads of commerce between nations. Though it is
now universally recognized that the high seas are not susceptible to
territorial appropriation and that they are free to the navigation of
all nations, this principle was not always so firmly established.
It is true that in antiquity and in the early Middle Ages the oceans
were regarded as open to the commerce of all peoples. According
to Ulpian and Celsus, "the sea and air are by nature free to all mankind." 45 But in the late Middle Ages and early modern times, the
nations of Europe began to lay claims to the adjacent seas and to
exercise authority over their waters. Venice and Genoa, respectively,
claimed the Adriatic and Ligurian Seas, while Sweden and Denmark
divided the Baltic between them. Great Britain was considered sovereign in the Narrow Seas and claimed proprietary rights in the North
Sea and over large portions of the Atlantic. In the late fifteenth century, the Iberian kingdoms advanced their dominion over land and
sea in two hemispheres, and their disputed claims were at length
settled by Pope Alexander VI in the bull Inter Caetera. Thus the
New World was divided between the Spanish and the Portuguese; and,
while the whole of the Pacific, as well as the Gulf of Mexico, was regarded as part of the Spanish domain, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans
were claimed by Portugal.
Britain, however, blind to obvious inconsistency, stoutly protested
the pretentious claims of Spain and Portugal and sent her bold navigators into the Spanish seas. When the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza,
protested the intrusion of the British in the Pacific, his representations were rejected by Queen Elizabeth in terms that gave her the
honor of being among the first in modern times to advocate freedom
of the seas. She refused to admit any Spanish rights to close the oceans
to navigation and trade, "seeing the use of the sea and air is common
to all," and that "neither nature nor public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof."

46

It was in 1604, nearly thirty years after Elizabeth's famous answer
to Mendoza, that a young advocate of The Hague, retained by the
45SvARLIEN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 185.

46Ibid.
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Dutch East India Company in the prize case Catherina, presented his
argument of mare liberum.47 In this famous dissertation, Grotius contended that it was an ordinance of nature that "one people should
supply the needs of another" and justified freedom of trade by the
fact that not every place and country is supplied with all the necessities of life. As Virgil sang long ago, "Not every plant in every soil
will grow."4 8 Grotius agreed with Seneca that nature's greatest service
to mankind was to have distributed the world's resources in such a
49
way that commerce between nations became a necessity.
Grotius advanced the proposition that all things which cannot
be effectively occupied or taken into permanent possession are ipso
facto free to all nations. This assertion he supported by reference to
the great authorities both of his own time and of antiquity. He quoted
Ovid as saying, "Nature has made neither sun nor air nor waves
private property; they are public gifts," and Seneca to the effect that
"every path was free, all things were used in common." 50 Thus Grotius arrived at the conclusion that the open sea cannot become the
private property of anyone, since nature has decreed that its use is
common to all. "Hence it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of
the sea can be considered as the territory of any people whatsoever....
It is clear therefore, to every one that he who prevents another from
navigating the sea has no support in law."'
The thesis advanced by Grotius in Mare Liberum and further
elaborated by a number of writers in the eighteenth century became,
at the end of the Napoleonic wars, a universally accepted principle of
international law. In the "Introduction" to Sir John Boroughs' Sovereignty of the British Seas, Thomas C. Wade concluded:52
"Throughout the writings of the later jurists of all countries
we find a steady progress toward the principle of the absolute
freedom of the sea. By the nineteenth century this freedom
had become axiomatic. The controversy had come to be of only
historical interest, as an illustration of an obsolete theory and
an example of the evolution of legal thought and international
practice. The high sea, therefore, is now free to all."
47See GRoTius, MARE LiBEauM vi, vii (Magoffin transl., Scott ed. 1916).
48
VIRGIL, GEoRGics II, 154 (Dryden transl. 1953).
49GRoTnUS, op. cit. supra note 47, at 7.
501d. at 24, 28.
52Id. at 34, 44.
521920 ed. 1-29.
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Now that man is on the threshold of space travel, and in search
of new rules to govern this adventure, it might be useful to look to
the experience of the past -to the evolution of the law of the sea.
In view of this experience it should not be necessary, in the building
of a law of space, to repeat the mistakes of the past or to travel the
same laborious way. Yet there are certain analogous features in the
laws of air and sea which it might be useful to consider.
The atmosphere or airspace of the earth is a vast ocean, which
science has rendered navigable to man. With respect to its legal
status, it might be said that, at the present time, positive international
air law recognizes the subjacent state as sovereign in the atmosphere
or airspace, very much in the same way that the littoral state is regarded as sovereign in the marginal seas. However, for the moment
at least, there is no universal agreement as to the linear measure of
territorial waters and atmospheric space. While the principle of innocent passage with respect to foreign merchant ships in territorial
waters is well established by the law of nations, the same cannot be
said to apply to foreign commercial and private planes in the territorial air. This is so because a variety of problems are necessarily
presented, in connection with aerial flights over the subjacent territories of foreign states, that are not encountered in ordinary maritime navigation. These problems spring from the general fact that
surface vessels in the territorial seas are subjected to geographical
limitations of movement which do not apply to freely moving aircraft.
For the reason of national security, which is here implied, and because
every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace over
its land and sea territories, the principle of innocent passage does not
apply to foreign aircraft in the same way that it applies to merchant
ships in territorial waters. In practice, however, innocent passage of
foreign aircraft is allowed, subject to certain limitations as provided
in a number of international conventions.
While the legal meaning of "complete and exclusive sovereignty
in the airspace" is still in doubt, experiments with rockets, missiles,
and artificial satellites have attracted the attention of lawyers to the
region beyond the earth's atmosphere, generally known as outer space.
It is plain that with the rapid advance of the technological revolution
the formulation of workable legal norms becomes increasingly difficult.
What is happening today may be compared in some ways to the
Copernican revolution of the sixteenth century, which at length compelled man to reappraise his conception of the universe. The strong
opposition to the theories and discoveries of Copernicus indicates how
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difficult it was, in those days, to abandon the ego-satisfying geocentric
orientation.
A projection of state sovereignty into outer space will, in the view
of this writer, create a disparity between a legal principle and a physical reality that could only compound the difficulty of solution. As
already seen, outer space is not an appurtenance of the earth in the
manner of the atmosphere. According to Stephen Gorove: 53
"There is a broad consensus of opinion that the elongation
of national sovereignty into the limitless spheres of the universe is, both from a theoretical and a practical viewpoint, untenable. It is pointed out that sovereignty cannot extend ad
infinitum because the very rotation of the earth and the difficulties involved in effectively controlling far distant regions
make the proposition that sovereignty should extend upwards
indefinitely an impracticable, if not an impossible, and meaningless abstraction.'"

53Gorove, supra note 40, at 318-19.
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